01585

1965/07/14

7/.4/65

Chiefs + Secs. comments on Plan III

1. Dave - doing it with mirrors -
should not hide from our people the full cost of program

2. Johnny - Plan III - is more of the same -

3. Dave: only personnel problems:
17 lighters (but "if we don't have them, we can get along")
6 seabee teams
3 troop transports

4. McDonnell - (re Oct '66 if could return personnel)
will be Feb '67 before achieved fully trained status -
will be 13 sqs short by Sept. 66 if we add "only 1 Sq/Mo per month" - i.e. that in the "1 billion buildup" -
if we lose the 13 sqs would have only 21 sqs in US strategic reserve to support 5 or 6 crises
would like to use C141 fresh from the 9th per mo
(he will show me indirect increase resulting from pers. inc. with 270 C141 inc.)
wants 2 more fighters in this but agreed to defer until 5 or 6 fighters have cleared priority -

Bellfour + Shannon - is working hard on the
will draw down war res below authorized
[illegible] should [illegible] the [illegible]

5. Paul questions whether call up of reserves would affect Southeast Asia -

6. Stan – Army is concerned that ① ammo. commitment in Army Ivy is not enough – ② 81 mm new round, which is many times more lethal, has not been put on order because of shortage of old stock on hand (would like $3 million for this) –

7. J. Murray – ① is concerned with quality of force structure – Plan III results in a 17,000 man Army strength which would be reduced if could retain men –

b) agrees with Dave that 1st plan is better –

c) Marines may need 155,000 instead of 135,000 in Plan II

d) we are dangerously low for forces available for commitment if something unforeseen (the unforeseen is only 5 weeks) –

8. McConnell – Run down B47's & B52's have orders to accelerate airlift –

9. Wolly – with 30,000 strength we can not support 3 of the 6 Ptns scheduled for Plan II (but if strength increases at or before time of deployment ppn 6 will be adequate) –

Bus' Review of Strategic Reserve
1. Hearing at '69 Strategic Res Div

v. 8 Army.
1 Hawaii
5 Mar.

1 V Division Stat Res

4 1/3 Army 40
V 18
6 1/3 58

4 2/3 Army
1 Marine
5 2/3 Stat Res (assuming no nothing + ROK's come thru + Hydra Room Rep)

add V Army Divs
1 Marine Res
5 Army Res
1 2/3

TRANSCRIPTION FOLLOWS

7/14/65

Chiefs & Secs Comments on Phase III

1. Dave – doing it with mirrors -

    should not hide from our people the full cost of program

2. Johnny - Phase III - is more of the same -

3. Dave: only personnel problems:

    17 destroyers (but "if we don't have them, we can get along")

    6 Seabee btns [battalions]

    3 Troop transports

4. McConnell – (no Det'LL if could retain personnel)

    will be Feb '67 before achieve fully trnd [trained] status –

    will be 13 sqs [squadrons] short by Sept '66 if we add only 1 [illegible]

    per month – i.e. that in the $1billion [illegible] -

    if we lose the 13 sqs [squadrons] would have only 21 sqs [squadrons]

    in [illegible] trng [training] base to support 52 overseas -

    would like to inc[lude] C141 first from the 7th [illegible] Air [illegible]

    (We will show some airlift increase resulting

    from personnel with & w/o C141 inc[luded])

    wants 2 more fields in Thai but agreed before [illegible]

    SVN fields have rec'd priority -

    [illegible] & Sparrow – is money limited & that

    will draw down war reserves below auth[orized] level

    believes we should [illegible]

5. Paul questions whether call up of reserves would affect

    Soviets & Chinese

6. Stan – Army is concerned that (1) ammo commitment in Army [illegible] is not enough - (2) 81 mm is now round, which is many times more lethal, has not been put on order because of supply of old stock on hand (would like $31 million for this)

7. Johnny – (a) is concerned with quality of force structure – Plan III results in a 17,000 man officer shortage which would be reduced if could retain men -

   b) agrees with Dave that 1st plan is better -

   c) believes may need 255,000 instead of 235,000 in Plan III

   d) we are dangerously low for forces available for commitment if something unplanned [illegible word] (the difference is only 8 wks) -

8. McConnell – run down B47s & B52 Bs [down] [under] & accelerate airlift

9. Wally – with 30,000 strength we can not support 3 of the 6 battalions scheduled for Phase II (but if strength increases at or before time of deployment of the 6, will be alright) -

Bns' Review of Strategic Reserve

1. [illegible-?Henry] [illegible word] by Strategic Res Div

2. 8 Army

1 Hawaii

3 Mar

12 Division Strat Res

4 1/3 Arm 4 D

2 18

6 1/3 58

4 2/3 Army

1 Mar

5 2/3 Strat Res (assuming do nothing & ROK comes through & exceeds [illegible])

Add 2 Army Divs

1 Mar Res

5 Army res

[illegible] / 2/3